nomic variables. For the purpose of this paper, the main contribution of these alternative lines of research is to suggest caution in the interpretation of empirical estimates of "demand for births" equations.
Empirical evidence from household data
We now turn to an evaluation of empirical evidence relating fertility differentials among couples to the distribution of income. Aside from research by Repetto (1979) and by Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) , most of the empirical literature on the social and economic determinants has not been concerned with testing hypotheses about the relations between the distribution of income or wealth and fertility. The usual approach to the estimation of fertility determinants consists of linear regressions of measures of fertility on variables such as the wife's education, a predicted value of the wife's wage, a measure of the husband's income, a set of variables controlling for the wife's age and duration of marriage, a measure of child mortality, and perhaps other social and economic variables. These equations are not useful for evaluation of the effects on fertility of policies to alter the distribution of income for at least two reasons. First, as noted by Repetto, the linear specifications of these equations presuppose that the partial derivative of fertility with respect to, say, the husband's income is the same at all levels of income. Consequently, the transfer of a dollar of income from the rich to the poor is assumed to decrease (or increase) the fertility of the rich as much as it increases (or decreases) the fertility of the poor. By assumption, then, redistribution of income leaves average fertility unaffected. Second, the equations do not relate fertility to policy variables. That is, even if one were to find a nonlinear association between, say, the husband's income and fertility, it would not show that all policies that transfer income from the rich to the poor reduce fertility. For example, child allowance programs that might on average redistribute income from the low-fertility rich to the high-fertility poor might, on balance, have pronatal consequences even though a direct redistribution of income might reduce fertility. With these caveats in mind, let us first consider Repetto's evidence for Puerto Rico and Korea. Repetto offers several tests of the hypothesis that there is a nonlinear relation between fertility and income in such a way that redistribution from rich to poor reduces fertility. The principal test consists of regressions of children ever born on income per household member (YPC), income per household member squared (YPC2), age of the wife, the wife's education, and other variables expected to influence fertility using data drawn from the 1970 census for Puerto Rico conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census (1973), and the 1974 Korean National Fertility Survey.
Consider first the results for Puerto Rico (Repetto, 1979: 54, 56, 58). In all regressions, the coefficient of YPC is negative and the coefficient of YPC2 is positive, and both coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. These coefficients imply that income redistribution from rich to poor reduces fertility. There are two important errors that lead one to reject this evidence as providing support for the hypothesis. First, as the economic model of fertility behavior outlined in the preceding section shows, total household income is not an exogenous variable, since the wife's hours of work and her earnings are determined simultaneously with decisions about fertility. ' Even if fertility had no relation to the husband's income, one might find a nonlinear relation of fertility to household income if, as abundant evidence suggests, fertility is negatively related to the wage that the woman could earn if employed and if her supply of labor (and her earnings) were positively related to her market wage and negatively to her husband's income.
This objection also applies to Repetto's test for nonlinearities using data on current fertility in Puerto Rico. After elaborating a stock adjustment model of fertility, he regresses the number of living children under age two on YPC, YPC2, the number of living children over age two, and other variables expected to influence fertility (Repetto, 1979: 63-66). Even if the household size used to deflate household income excludes children under age two (see below) and even if there is no relation between the husband's income and fertility, there is likely to be a strong negative correlation between "current fertility" and household income per capita because of the strong influence of the presence of young children on the wife's labor force participation (Boulier, 1977a) . The effect may be nonlinear since the marginal effect of a second preschool child on the mother's hours of work is less than that of a first child (Boulier, 1977a: 216-219) .
The second error, and one that is acknowledged by Repetto, involves the use of a per capita income measure in the fertility regressions. That is, it is quite possible that the use of a per capita income measure "introduces a spurious nonlinearity into the income-fertility association" (Repetto, 1979: 52-53). If, for example, all couples had the same income, then the relation between fertility and household per capita income would be described by a rectangular hyperbola. In this case, a regression of fertility on YPC and YPC2 would show evidence of nonlinearity. More generally, the relation between fertility and YPC and YPC2 depends upon the underlying relation of fertility to income and the distribution of income. Repetto contends that the bias towards finding a nonlinear relation between fertility and per capita income in Puerto Rico is small since regressions of fertility on YPC and YPC2 within narrow classes of total household income do not show the nonlinearity apparent in aggregate data and since fertility is nonlinearly related to total household income. Nonetheless, it is still statistically inappropriate to regress fertility on YPC and YPC2 since these variables are dependent on fertility and therefore endogenously determined.
In order to examine empirically the nature of the bias involved in relating fertility to per capita income, I have constructed a sample of 500 women having the parity distribution of women aged 45-49 in Puerto Rico in 1970 and assigned to each woman a husband's income drawn at random from a lognormal distribution of income having the median and Gini coefficient corresponding to the distribution of income among Puerto Rican men aged 5054 In contrast to the preceding regression, the independent variables "explain" nearly 20 percent of the variance of CEB, and the coefficients of YHPC and YHPC2, which are highly statistically significantly different from zero, imply a nonlinear relation between fertility and income in such a way that transfers of income from the rich to the poor reduce fertility. From this experiment, one must conclude that regressions relating fertility to per capita income measures cannot be used to test hypotheses relating fertility change to income redistribution. Repetto's tests of the nonlinear relation between income and fertility in Korea (Repetto, 1979: 107-116) are subject to the same criticisms given above. In addition, his regressions include variables such as preferred family size at time of first marriage and an index of expected old age support from children. The values of these variables may depend in part on past childbearing experience. For instance, couples who are either voluntarily or involuntarily childless are not likely to expect old age support from children, and answers to questions about preferred family size at time of marriage are subject to problems of rationalization and recall. As a result, these variables cannot be used as exogenous predictors of fertility as is assumed in the ordinary least squares method of estimating the fertility equation.
In order to explore the relations of fertility to the distribution of income using a more satisfactory specification of the fertility equation, I have examined the socioeconomic determinants of the number of children ever born (CEB) and the number of living children (CLIV) among a sample of once married, spouse present Filipino women aged 25 to 50 and married for at least 1 year, taken from the 1973 Philippines National Demographic Survey conducted by the National Census and Statistics Office and the University of the Philippines Population Institute. The independent variables include the education of the wife (EDW) and her education squared (EDW2), the husband's annual income (YH) and income squared (YH2), a dummy variable (AG) taking on the value 1 if the husband was employed in agriculture and 0 otherwise, the age of the wife (AGEW), the child survival rate from birth to age 5 in the province in which the wife resides (L5), and the cumulative of the Coale-Trussell natural fertility schedule (1977) from the wife's age at marriage to her age at the date of the survey (SUP). SUP is included to standardize for the wife's age and duration of marriage in a sample of women not all of whom have completed fertility (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1978) . If age patterns of natural fertility are accurately described by the natural fertility schedule, AGEW should capture cohort differences in fertility behavior (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1978) . In the equations with the number of living children as the dependent variable, SUP and AGEW also adjust, albeit very crudely, for the duration of exposure of children to the risk of dying and time trends in mortality. The estimate of L5 is based on reports of children ever born and children surviving taken from the 1970 Philippines census using techniques described by Trussell (1975 Table 2 also presents regressions of CEB and CLIV on crude estimates of the husband's income per household member (YHPC) and the husband's income per capita squared (YHPC2), obtained by dividing the husband's income by family size, defined as two parents plus the number of living children.
In the first regression presented in Table 2 , all coefficients are statis- tically significantly different from zero except the coefficients of L5 and EDW. As expected, fertility is positively related to AGEW and SUP and couples in which the husband is employed in agriculture have higher fertility than other couples. If the point estimate of the coefficient of EDW is accepted as accurate, then, other things being equal, fertility reaches a maximum at 3.6 years of education. Thus, increasing years of schooling beyond this point reduces fertility, although the effect of additional years of schooling is not very great. If EDW increases from the sample average of 6.06 years to 11 years, other things being equal, the average number of children ever born per woman declines by only .11. Of course, this calculation is only an illustration since it does not take account of the possibility that such a large increase in human capital would alter the structure of female and male wage rates, ages at marriage, and child survival rates, so that the values of other variables held constant in the equation and the coefficients of the equation would be affected by such a policy. It should be noted that the nature of the nonlinear relation between fertility and female education is such that a redistribution of a fixed stock of years of schooling from better-educated women to women with fewer years of school-ing increases the average level of fertility. For example, if a woman with 11 years of schooling had attained only 10 years of schooling and this additional year of schooling were given to a woman with 1 year of schooling, the number of births would increase by .07. The estimated relation between fertility and husband's income indicates that fertility rises as income increases for values of YH less than 6,500 pesos (a value of YH more than twice the sample mean) and that fertility is negatively associated with income for values of YH greater than 6,500 pesos.3 The nonlinear relation is such that a transfer of income from a husband with higher income to a husband with lower income raises fertility. As examples, a transfer of P1,000 from a husband earning twice the sample average income to one earning one-half the sample average raises the number of children ever born to the two couples by .03; a transfer of P1,000 from a husband having an income four times the sample average income to one having one-fourth the sample average raises the number of children ever born by .15. While such transfers of income do not lead to the declines in fertility postulated by Repetto, it is perhaps gratifying that the increases in fertility resulting from such transfers are rather small.
The second column of Table 2 illustrates the consequences of using the husband's income per family member rather than the husband's income as the basic income measure in the fertility regressions. In contrast to the results reported above that show that the relation between fertility and the husband's income resembles an inverted U, the Repetto-like specification shows that the relation between fertility and husband's income per family member if Ushaped, thus providing further evidence that the use of per capita income measures leads to misleading estimates of the effects of income redistribution on fertility.
The signs and statistical significance of the coefficients of the equation with surviving children as the dependent variable are similar to those in the CEB equations, the main difference being that the coefficient of EDW is statistically significantly different from zero in the CLIV equations. Consistent with previous research showing positive relations of child survival rates to the wife's education and the husband's income in the Philippines (Boulier and Mankiw, 1980), the positive impact of redistribution on surviving children is greater than on children ever born. A transfer of 1 year of schooling from a woman with 11 years of schooling to one with 1 year of schooling increases the number of surviving children by .13; a transfer of P1,000 from a husband having an income four times the sample average to one having an income one-fourth the sample average raises the number of surviving children by .19.
As noted in the beginning of this section, there has been little empirical research on the influence of income redistribution on fertility aside from that of Repetto. One exception is Rosenzweig's and Evenson's (1977) analysis of the determinants of fertility among rural women in India. Using district-level data from the 1961 Indian census, they estimate a multiequation model relating child-woman ratios, proportions of children in school, and labor force participation rates to male, female, and child wage rates, the Kuznets index of landholdings inequality, and other economic variables. They find that this index of landholdings inequality is negatively related to the child-woman ratio and "suggest that reducing the inequality of landholdings would increase the family size in India" (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977: 1,075). While their conclusion may be correct, the difficulty with this evidence is that the child-woman ratio (an index reflecting both fertility and mortality) is calculated for all rural women, including women who live in households owning no land, while the Kuznets index (1976) is calculated only for the distribution of landholdings among landowners. An inequality index including the landless would be a more appropriate independent variable. Repetto (1979: 140-141) has also criticized the Rosenzweig and Evenson findings, although it appears that his criticisms are not fully correct. First, he suggests that one should look at the relation between fertility and the distribution of landholdings per household member rather than the relation between fertility and landholdings unadjusted for household size. Since this procedure is subject to the same biases involved in relating fertility to per capita income measures, it should not be recommended. Second, he argues that the crosssectional findings of Rosenzweig and Evenson contradict "the historical evidence of the consequences of land reform in developing countries like Korea . . . [and that] in none of the countries in which thorough-going land reform has been carried through has there been a subsequent sustained increase in fertility" (Repetto, 1979: 140). While it is true that fertility in Korea, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China has fallen dramatically in recent years and that all three countries had thorough land reforms, it does not necessarily follow that the land reforms in these countries accelerated their fertility declines. Moreover, there is at least one case where land reform has been followed by a sustained increase in fertility. Despite substantial land reform (collectivization), marital fertility of women in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union increased by nearly 50 percent between 1926 and 1970, and 1970 age patterns of fertility do not indicate prevalence of voluntary control (Coale, 1978: 411) .
In summary, there is little empirical research to indicate how fertility responds to changes in the distribution of income. Evidence provided by Repetto in support of the proposition that income redistribution reduces fertility contains important theoretical and econometric errors. My own analysis of Philippine data suggests that marginal transfers of income from the rich to the poor increase fertility, although the estimated effect of such redistribution is rather small. Questions yet to be answered are whether the Philippine findings apply to other countries and how fertility responds to income redistribution programs.
Macroeconomic evidence
As additional evidence for the proposition that reductions in income inequality reduce fertility, Repetto (1973, 1978, 1979) has examined the relations between fertility and the distribution of income at the national level. As my earlier research suggests (Boulier, 1975) and as Repetto (1978, 1979 ) agrees, it is not possible to conclude from the simple positive correlation between measures of fertility and income inequality among nations that reductions in income inequality reduce fertility, since levels and trends in fertility and mortality and in the differentials in fertility and mortality by socioeconomic class may affect the evolution of income distribution over time. That is, average levels of fertility and mortality and their differentials among socioeconomic classes influence the rate of growth of labor supply, the accumulation of physical and human capital, factor and goods prices, and the distribution of human and physical capital among classes (Boulier, 1975; Lindert, 1978 
where DISED is an index of the dispersion of adult educational attainment and LAND is the share of the smallest 60 percent of holdings in total cropped area; and the infant mortality equation is:
where NUTR is average caloric intake per capita. The model is estimated by two-stage least squares techniques. It is doubtful whether this specification can be an adequate representation of the forces underlying the relations among fertility, mortality, and the distribution of income. If fertility is nonlinearly related to education within populations and if the distribution of assets or land influences fertility, as is argued by Rosenzweig and Evenson in the case of India and by Repetto in the cases of Korea and India, then DISED and LAND belong in the fertility equation. Since some of the arguments relating demographic variables stress the importance of rapid growth rates of population as an influence on the distribution of income, the omission of this variable from the distribution equation is probably important. The equation explaining infant mortality rates is also incomplete. Given nonlinear relations between child survival and education in developing countries (Boulier and Paqueo, 1980; Trussell and Preston, 1980) and between mortality and income (Preston, 1980 : 291-293) , variables measuring average education and income per capita and the dispersion of these variables within countries should be included in the mortality equation. In short, this econometric model, while perhaps useful as a starting point for the analysis of the interrelations between demographic variables and the distribution of income, is sufficiently incomplete that empirical results based upon it should be viewed with caution.
Perhaps as serious a reason for viewing the results with caution is the nature of the data on which they are based. The poor quality of mortality and fertility data from many developing countries is well known. Moreover, the accuracy of demographic data is undoubtedly correlated with levels of economic development and educational attainment. Unfortunately, the exact nature of the biases in estimated coefficients due to inaccurate demographic data in this multiequation system is difficult to assess.
Income distribution data in developing countries are also often of poor quality. In addition, measures of economic inequality are sensitive to definitions of income and households and to the distributions of individuals among households (Kuznets, 1976) . Kusnic and DaVanzo (1980: 28) illustrate how variations in the definition of income affect measures of the distribution of income in a sample of Malaysian households. When income is defined as the sum of wages, business, and capital income, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household income is .616. Adding transfer income, the value of housing services, in-kind income, and cottage-industry income reduces the Gini coefficient to .567. Adding the imputed value of housework, cooking, and child care reduces the Gini coefficient to .480. Since in-kind receipts and consumption out of own produce as shares of income vary with the level of development, since countries differ in their inclusion and valuation of these sources of income, and since income distribution measures appear to be sensitive to the treatment of these sources of income, it is doubtful whether the income distribution data are sufficiently comparable among countries to support the econometric analysis for which they are used.
As noted above, noncomparability of income distribution data may also arise because of differences among countries in the definitions of households and differences in the distribution of individuals among households. To illustrate the problems of interpreting trends in income inequality caused by changes in the distribution of individuals among households, let us consider the cases of Japan and the United States. In Japan, the Gini coefficient based on total household income rose from .31 to .41 over the period 1956 to 1971 (Wada, 1975 . Over this period, there was a large rise in the number of singleperson households, especially among the age groups 15-29 and 65 and older. These households had relatively low total income, and their rising share of all households contributed to the increase in the Gini coefficient based on total household income. If the Gini coefficient had been calculated from data on income per person, an index less sensitive to changes in household structure, the apparent worsening of income distribution in Japan would have been less pronounced, since single-person households had relatively high per capita incomes.
As an additional example, Treas and Walther (1978) demonstrate that the Theil index of inequality of household income in the United States would have declined substantially more than it did from 1951 to 1974 had there not been considerable growth in the number of unrelated individuals relative to family units.
There are substantial differences among nations in the distributions of individuals among households (Kuznets, 1980: 4) .4 These differences are in part due to cultural practices, economic forces governing the costs and rewards of forming households of different sizes (Ben-Porath, 1980b), "demographic constraints on the supply of partners of a particular status" (Ben-Porath, 1980b: 19), and variations in age distributions. As shown above, measures of income inequality are sensitive to the distribution of individuals among households. It therefore follows that the measured distribution of income among households reflects these underlying social, economic, and demographic factors. Fertility is also influenced by some of these same social and economic factors. As a result, it is most unclear whether the statistical association between the distribution of income and fertility among nations is a causal association or merely a spurious correlation due to underlying (unmeasured) social and economic factors jointly determining fertility and the distribution of income.5
Conclusion
Economic theory suggest that fertility decisions are influenced by variables such as the prices of goods and services, assets, and wage rates of men, women, and children. Factor prices, goods prices, and the distribution of holdings of human physical capital also determine the distribution of income. Were fertility related to goods and factor prices and to the distribution of assets in such a way that redistribution of assets from the rich to the poor or policies to alter the structure of prices to benefit the poor would reduce fertility, then those who favor programs to reduce income inequality would have an additional argument for the support of such programs.
In this paper, I have reviewed the microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence offered by Repetto and others in support of the hypothesis that income redistribution decreases fertility and have found it unconvincing. Moreover, an analysis of household data from the Philippines suggests that fertility-income relations are such that marginal transfers of income from the rich to the poor increase fertility, although only by a small amount. In short, there is no evidence for the proposition that reductions in income inequality induce declines in fertility. 1 Total household income also includes the economic contributions of children. The magnitude of these contributions is, of course, also endogenous.
2 The parity distribution of women was estimated from data given in United States Bureau of the Census (1973: Table 128, p. 703). In constructing the parity distribution among women with five or more children, it was assumed that the ratio of the number of women with n + 1 births to the number of women with n births (for n greater than or equal to 4) equaled the ratio of the number of women with four births to the number of women with three births and that no woman had more than 14 births. Use of this procedure resulted in an estimate of 22,085 women in Puerto Rico having five or more births, nearly identical to the census estimate of 22,232 women with five or more births. For men aged 50-54 with income, the median income was $2,710 and the Gini coefficent was .522 (United States Bureau of the Census, 1973: Table 153 , p. 1,096). The relation between the Gini coefficient and the log variance of a lognormal distribution is described in Aitchison and Brown (1957: 112) and the procedure for drawing a random variable from a lognormal distribution is given in Hastings and Peacock (1975) .
3 Nearly identical results are obtained if an estimate of the husband's permanent income is used instead of current income. The husband's permanent income was predicted from an auxiliary regression in which the natural logarithm of the husband's earnings was regressed against his schooling, age, agesquared, the Duncan occupational index corresponding to his occupation, community size, and farm background. 
